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A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India shows that 27% of the stores find labor 
regulations as a problem for their business. Using these data, we analyze the effect of 
labor regulations on employment at the store level. We find that flexible labor regulations 
have a strong positive effect on job creation. Our estimates show that labor reforms are 
likely to increase employment by 22% of the current level for an average store. We also 
address the issue of informality in India’s retail sector. Our findings suggest that more 
flexible labor laws can encourage firms to operate in the more efficient formal retail 
sector. According to our estimates, labor reforms could reduce the level of informality by 
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1.  Introduction 
A large body of literature analyzes the effect of labor regulations on output and 
employment. For example, Botero et al (2004) look at labor laws in a cross section of 85 
countries and find that more rigid regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force 
participation and higher unemployment. India finds a special place in this literature for its 
rigid labor laws.
1 Besley and Burgess (2004) find substantially reduced levels of 
employment, investment, productivity and output in the registered manufacturing sector 
of India due to stricter labor laws. Similar findings are reported by Ahsan and Pages 
(2007) for large manufacturing firms. A key question is whether one can find similar 
effects in other sectors of India and estimate their magnitudes. The present paper attempts 
to answer this question for the retail sector in India, the second largest employer after 
agriculture in the country.
2 
  The literature mentioned above is primarily focused on the relationship between 
employment and labor regulation. However, this relationship is not obvious and requires 
empirical verification. For example, while stricter labor laws increase the cost of hiring 
labor, they also make it more difficult to fire workers. The former tends to slow down job 
creation while the latter reduces job destruction. Hence, the direction of the overall effect 
on employment is not certain (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). Further, the effect of labor 
regulation may extend to factors other than labor employment. For instance, Almeida and 
Carneiro (Forthcoming) show that, for a sample of Brazilian firms, stricter enforcement 
                                                 
1 For example, the World Bank’s Doing Business project ranks India at 112 of 175 countries on the rigidity 
of employment regulation (World Bank, 2006).  
2 The retail and wholesale sector is the second largest employer in India after agriculture accounting for 
over 9% of all jobs and its share in GDP equals 14% (Banga 2005, Gordon and Gupta 2004).   2
of labor laws alters firm characteristics such as size, use of informal labor, etc. These 
effects have a significant impact on the overall performance of the economy.  
  Another possibility is that labor regulations alter the composition of activity 
between the formal and informal sector. Stringent labor laws may encourage firms to 
operate in the informal sector where labor laws are hardly implemented. Similarly, if 
stricter labor laws reduce employment opportunities in the formal sector then some 
workers may seek work in the informal sector. The compositional shift (from formal to 
informal) is important because the informal sector is known to be less efficient than the 
formal sector and beset with a number of problems such as poor access to finance and 
contract-enforcement agencies (Djankov et al. 2003a), inefficiently small scale of 
production with little incentive to use modern technology, and lack of occupation and 
safety standards for workers.  
One limitation of existing work on labor regulations is that it is based solely on 
labor laws as they exist on the books with no consideration given to their enforcement. 
Hence, findings in the literature would mean little if there is a dichotomy between laws 
on the books and their enforcement. The World Bank Enterprise Survey provides 
valuable information on how stores perceive the severity of labor regulations for doing 
business. 27% of the stores in the full sample reported labor regulations as an obstacle for 
their business with a high of 53% in the state of West Bengal, 42% in Rajasthan and 39% 
in Maharashtra. These numbers dispel the notion that labor laws are not implemented in 
the retail sector for, absent enforcement, labor laws would not be an obstacle for any 
store. We use these reported perceptions to construct a measure of enforcement of labor   3
laws and show that our results do not suffer from the potential weakness mentioned 
above. 
The present paper contributes to the literature on labor regulation in two important 
ways. First, we focus on the service sector in a developing country.
 The existing work on 
labor regulations is focused on manufacturing sectors despite the fact that services sectors 
are known to be highly labor intensive, accounting for a majority of jobs across countries. 
The retail and wholesale sector in India is the second largest employer (after agriculture) 
providing jobs to 9.4% of all formal workers in the country. An adverse effect of labor 
regulations on employment in the sector can have a significant impact on overall 
unemployment in the country. Second, existing studies are based on macro data which 
raises concerns about possible heterogeneity across data points. Our use of micro data 
allows us to control for a number of store (firm) characteristics that vary within and 
across good and bad regulation states. We are also able to analyze possible heterogeneity 
in the effect of labor laws on employment across small vs. large stores and temporary vs. 
permanent employment.   
  Our findings on the effect of labor regulation on employment are consistent with 
the emerging literature on the institutions-performance nexus which Djankov et al. 
(2003b) refers to as “the new comparative economics”. The main theme of this literature 
is that with the collapse of socialism, the real comparison is now between various 
dimensions of the quality of institutions within capitalist countries. Studies in this 
literature show that economic outcomes are significantly affected by, for example, 
regulation of entry (Djankov et al. 2002), enforcement of creditor rights (Safavian and   4
Sharma 2007), enforcement of labor laws (Almeida and Carneiro, Forthcoming) and 
corruption (Bo and Rossi 2007).  
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the structure of labor 
laws, describe our data and the estimation strategy. In sections 3 we report our main 
empirical findings for the level of employment at the store level. Section 4 contains the 
robustness checks. In section 5 we analyze the relationship between labor regulation and 
the level of informality. A summary of the main findings is provided in the concluding 
section. 
 
2.  Data and Main Variables 
We use store level data collected by the World Bank in 2006 (Enterprise surveys). The 
data consist of a stratified random sample of 1,948 retail stores (cross-section) operating 
in the formal sector and located in 16 major states and 41 cities of India.
3 The National 
Industrial Classification (NIC-1998, Industry Division 52) classifies retailers into those 
operating through established stores and the rest who usually operate from home. All 
stores in our sample belong to the former category. 
  The survey contains information on a variety of store characteristics such as 
annual sales, employment, availability of infrastructure, access to finance, etc. It also 
                                                 
3 The sampling frame for the survey was the list of retail stores regularly interviewed by AC Nielson for 
inventory verification on behalf of distributors of branded goods. This list covers stores in 41 cities across 
India for three major industry segments: Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) stores (traditional stores), 
consumer durable stores and the modern format stores. A definition of these industry segments is provided 
in Table 1. The sample was stratified according to segment-specific criteria. FMCG stores were stratified 
based on turnover, number of salesmen, number of FMCG product and the presence of cooling equipment. 
Consumer durable and modern format stores were stratified based on turnover. The sample size was 
determined so as to minimize the standard error in the sample variables, given the available resources for 
each surveying stratum. Once the sample size was determined, the sample was allocated to strata using 
Neymann’s allocation rule. More information about the survey and methodology is available at 
www.enterprisesurveys.org.   5
reports on the store manager’s perceptions about various aspects of the business climate 
such as the severity of labor regulations, tax rates and restrictions on store-hour 
operations. We exploit this rich set of information and complement with external data 
sources to show that our results are robust to a number of store, city and state 
characteristics. 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
A definition of all the variables used in the regressions is provided in Table 1. Our main 
dependent variable is the number of employees working in a store during the fiscal year 
2005-06 (Employment). We do not include the manager (usually the owner) of the store 
in  Employment. Total employees include temporary and permanent workers (defined 
below). The mean value of Employment is 4.7 and the standard deviation equals 24.6. 
Across states, Employment is highest in the state of Andhra Pradesh (14.1) and lowest in 
Haryana (0.9). In separate regressions, we also use the number of permanent and 
temporary employees at the store level as dependent variables. Permanent employees are 
defined as all paid employees that are contracted for a term of one or more fiscal year 
and/or have a guaranteed renewal of their employment contract and that work 8 or more 
hours per day. Temporary workers are defined as all paid short-term (less than a fiscal 
year) employees with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract and that work 8 or 
more hours per day. We expect the effect of labor regulations to be much stronger (more 
negative) on permanent than temporary employment since labor regulations are directed 
mostly towards permanent employees.  
   6
2.2  Labor Laws in India’s  retail sector 
Our main explanatory variable is an index of labor regulations for the retail sector in 
India. We provide a brief description of these regulations to motivate the analysis that 
follows. Labor regulations for India’s retail sector fall under the jurisdiction of the state 
governments and are contained in the Shops and Establishments Act (SEA). The SEA is a 
state legislation and contains various laws relating to working conditions of the 
employees. The main provisions of the Act include compulsory registration of 
shop/establishment within thirty days of commencement of work, minimum wages, 
regulation of hours of work per day and week, guidelines for spread-over, rest interval, 
opening and closing hours, closed days, national and religious holidays, overtime work, 
rules for employment of children, young persons and women, rules for annual leave, 
maternity leave, sickness and casual leave, etc., rules for employment and termination of 
service; obligations of employers, obligations of employees, communications of closure 
of the establishment within 15 days from the closing of the establishment.  
In Table 2 we report on the level of minimum wages prescribed in the various 
state SEAs along with the ones for some of the manufacturing sectors. The table reveals 
that minimum wages in retailing are not too different from the ones in the manufacturing 
sectors. To get a better idea of what specific provisions in the SEA entail, we list some of 
these provisions for the state of Maharashtra, the most prosperous state and the retailing 
hub of India. Retail shops in the state are covered by the Bombay Shops & 
Establishments Act of 1948. The Act was established in 1937 but underwent substantial 
changes in 1948 and some modifications thereafter. Currently, the Act stipulates that 
under normal circumstances an employee cannot be required or allowed to work for more   7
than nine hours in a day and 48 hours in a week (Section 14), any work beyond the 
stipulated working hours (overtime work) must be paid at double the normal wage rate of 
the employee, an employee must be allowed an interval of rest of at least one hour after 
five hours of continuous work (Section 15) and his spread-over cannot exceed eleven 
hours in a day (Sub-sections 16 & 17), every shop must remain closed on one day of the 
week and no deduction of wages is to be made for the closing day (Section 18), women 
are not allowed to work either as employees or otherwise after 9:30 p.m. (Sub-sections 33 
& 34A), young people in the age group of 15-17 years are not allowed to work after 7 
p.m. and for more than six hours in a single day (Sections 33, 34 & 34A), an employee is 
entitled to annual leave with pay for 21 days for 240 days of work (Sub-sections 35-37) 
and all provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 and Workmen’s Compensation 
Act of 1923 apply to every shop covered by the Act. 
One concern is whether labor laws in the SEA are actually enforced. The 
Enterprise survey provides valuable information on this point. Specifically, stores were 
asked the following: “Are labor regulations no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate 
obstacle, major obstacle or very severe obstacle to the current operations of the store?” 
Answers to the question were recorded on a 0-4 scale with a higher score implying a 
greater obstacle. Labor regulations are unlikely to be a problem for the employers if they 
are not enforced. For the full sample, 27% of the stores reported labor regulations to be a 
problem (minor or more). For these 27% of the stores, roughly one third find labor 
regulations as more than a minor problem. At the high end, 53% of the stores in West 
Bengal, 44% in Rajasthan, 39% in Maharashtra and 33% in Delhi report labor regulations 
as a problem. Corresponding figures for labor regulations as more than a minor problem   8
are 25%, 12%, 10% and 17%, respectively. Figure 1 shows the percentage of all stores 
who find labor regulations as obstacles for all the states in our sample. These numbers 
suggest a substantial enforcement of labor laws and that a substantial number of retail 




2.3  Explanatory variables 
A list of the main explanatory variables, summary statistics and correlations between 
them is provided in Table 3. We use two separate measures of labor regulation. The first 
measure, the Regulation index, is an index of labor laws for the manufacturing sectors in 
India due to Besley and Burgess (2004).
5 The motivation here is that labor laws are to a 
large extent determined by political factors which are likely to be similar across 
manufacturing and services sectors like retailing. That is, governments that are likely to 
implement rigid labor laws in manufacturing are also likely to implement rigid labor laws 
in retailing.  
The Regulation index is based on laws on the books and does not capture their 
actual enforcement. Also, there could be a concern that the index is not specific to the 
retail sector. We address these problems using a second measure of labor regulation, the 
Enforcement index, derived from store’s perceptions about the severity of labor laws. 
Specifically, the Enforcement index equals the state level average of the scores reported 
by stores on the labor regulation as an obstacle question mentioned above. We note that 
                                                 
4 For example, KPMG recently conducted a survey of retail firms in India (KPMG, 2005). This report 
shows that in the “Fast moving consumer goods” section of retailing about 35% of the firms reported labor 
regulations as a significant problem (p. 19). These stores account for 80% of consumer spending in the 
country. 
5 We use year 2000 values of the Regulation index which is the latest year for which the index is available.    9
store’s response to the question will depend on the severity of labor laws (on the books), 
their enforcement and, to some extent, their characteristics (age, etc.). Averaging helps in 
filtering out the influence of store characteristics on the index leaving us with a measure 
of labor laws on the books cum enforcement. We complement the filtering process by 
directly controlling for a large number of store characteristics (age, level of competition, 
etc.) in the regressions. One could argue that using information from within the survey to 
construct the Enforcement index may exacerbate endogeneity concerns. However, this is 
also an advantage because information on factors that may exacerbate the endogeneity 
problem is also available in the survey and we can use this information to control for 
these factors. 
There is substantial variation in the Enforcement index across states ranging from 
0.109 (Haryana) to 0.81 (West Bengal). The mean value of the index equals 0.345 and 
the standard deviation equals 0.194 (Table 3). Figure 2 shows the full distribution of the 
index across states. As we might expect, the two labor regulation indices are positively 
correlated upto 0.473. Without much loss of generality, we will use the terms labor laws 
and labor regulation synonymously with the Regulation index and the Enforcement index. 
Distinction between the two indices is made where necessary. 
  Since the labor regulation indices are defined at the state level, direct reverse 
causality from Employment (which varies at the store level) to labor regulation is 
unlikely. However, it is possible that the labor regulation indices may be correlated with 
other determinants of Employment implying an omitted variable bias in our estimation. 
We check for this problem in two ways. First, by directly controlling for a large number 
of variables at the store, city and state level. Second, we contrast the effect of labor   10
regulations on temporary and permanent employment. We expect labor regulations to 
affect employment of these two types of workers differently (as discussed above), a result 
that is unlikely if the labor regulation indices were picking up the effect on employment 
of overall development, store characteristics, etc. 
 
2.3.1  Other explanatory variables 
One concern with estimating the effect of labor regulation on employment could be that 
the labor regulation indices may pick up differences in income levels across states.  States 
with higher income levels are likely to have better physical and financial infrastructure, 
quality of institutions, etc., which should have a positive effect on the marginal 
productivity of labor and therefore the level of employment (confirmed below). However, 
correlation between our labor regulation indices and current (2003-04) per capita income 
of states (Income) is also positive equaling 0.060 for the Regulation index and 0.223 for 
the Enforcement index. The structure of correlations here implies that failure to control 
for income level (and its covariates) is likely to bias the estimated coefficient of the labor 
regulation indices towards zero (confirmed below). 
  A second problem with the estimation could arise due to a correlation between the 
severity of labor regulation and wage rate or the opportunity cost of labor. Of course, part 
of the wage differential across states is likely to reflect differences in the underlying labor 
laws (minimum wages) but some of it could be due to differences in labor supply and 
demand conditions that have little to do with labor laws. We resolve the identification 
problem by showing that our results for the effect of labor regulation on employment 
hold with and without controlling for wage rate. Since wage rate captures some aspects of   11
labor laws, we expect the negative effect of labor laws on employment to fall (become 
less negative) when we control for the wage rate. Hence, on this count, the results for 
labor regulation-employment relationship discussed below are on the conservative side. 
  Our measure of wage rate equals total labor cost divided by total labor 
employment in all manufacturing sectors at the state level (Wage rate). Data source for 
the variable is Annual Survey of Industries (2003-04). To ensure that our results are not 
sensitive to the wage rate in the manufacturing sectors, we checked all our results with an 
alternative wage measure which is same as above but derived from the survey of the 
services sectors conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO, 56
th 
round). Our main results are roughly similar with either of these wage measures but the 
manufacturing wage rate shows a stronger effect on employment.  
  Our next control is total population of the city in 2001 (Population). Larger cities 
in India (in terms of population) are known to be richer, more developed and the main 
beneficiaries on the ongoing retail boom. We treat Population as a proxy for the level of 
overall development of cities complementing the Income variable. 
  Our last control in the main specification is age of the store (Age). Older stores are 
known to be more efficient and larger due to learning by doing or selection related 
effects. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between age and employment. This 
could create a bias in the estimated effect of labor regulation on employment if the age 
structure varies systematically with the stringency of labor laws. One possibility here is 
that younger stores may be more sensitive to changes in labor laws than older stores 
because the former have less location specific sunk cost. If this is indeed true then we 
expect age and the severity of labor regulations to be inversely correlated (younger stores   12
choosing to locate in less regulated states) while the direct effect of age on employment is 
likely to be positive. The structure of correlations here suggests that failure to control for 
age is likely to bias the estimated coefficient of the labor regulation indices towards zero. 
Our results below confirm such a downward bias although its magnitude is small, 
implying that labor regulation is not too important for store’s location choice.
6 
 
3.  Estimation 
Our base regression is the following 
 
i i c s
s s o i
u Age Population rate Wage
Income Regs Employment








i denotes a store, s the state and c the city in which it is located, Employmenti is total 
employment in store i, Regs is the index of labor regulation (Regulation index and the 
Enforcement index in separate regressions) and    i u is the error term. The remaining 
variables in the equation are as defined above. The coefficient of interest is    β  which we 
expect to be negative. It captures the impact on employment of a unit increase in the 
labor regulation index. In all our regressions we use Huber-White robust standard errors 
clustered on the state.
7 
 
3.1 Base regression results 
                                                 
6 This result is not surprising. Most retailers in India are small and they usually operate in their city of 
residence (birth). Further, e-commerce is still rare in the country which makes it difficult for stores to 
operate remotely (from less labor regulated states). 
7 Our results do not change if we cluster the errors on the city. Clustering lowers the t-statistic of our 
coefficients of interest.   13
Estimation results using the Regulation index are reported in Table 4. Irrespective of the 
controls, the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index is negative and significant at 
either less than or close to the 1% level. Without any additional controls, the estimated 
coefficient of the index equals -0.471 with a p-value of 0.012 (column 1, Table 4). The 
estimate implies that lowering the severity of labor regulation from its median to the 
lowest value increases employment (per store) by 1.18 persons or 25% of the mean level 
of employment. 
  The results do not change much when we control for the remaining variables 
discussed above. Controlling for state per capita income, the estimated coefficient of the 
labor regulation index increases (in absolute value) from -0.471 to -0.511 and it is 
significant at less than 1% level (column 2, Table 4). The increase in the coefficient value 
is consistent with our prediction above that failure to control for income or overall 
development of states is likely to bias the estimated effect of labor regulation on 
employment in the downward direction. Further, income shows a positive effect on 
employment although this is not too significant (p-value of 0.131). In column 3 of Table 
4 we add wage rate to the specification. As expected, higher wage rate has a negative 
effect on employment, significant at less than 5% level (p-value of 0.040). The estimated 
coefficient of the labor regulation index declines from -0.511 to -0.426 but remains 
significant at the 1% level. Controlling for population (column 4, Table 4), we find that it 
has only a weak positive effect on employment (p-value of 0.469) and, like income, it 
causes the estimated coefficient of the labor regulation index to increase (from -0.426 to -
0.472) without much change in its significance level. Lastly, we control for age of the 
store (column 5, Table 4). Age shows a positive effect on employment significant at less   14
than 10% level (p-value of 0.098). However, controlling for age does not make much 
difference to the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index which shows only a slight 
increase from -0.472 above to -0.499 (p-value of 0.006). The small increase here 
confirms our prediction above that self-selection of stores across good and bad labor 
regulation states is unlikely to affect our main results much. 
  If we take the most conservative estimate of the coefficient of the Regulation 
index (in column 3 of Table 4), it implies that reducing the severity of labor laws from its 
median to the lowest value would increase employment in the sector by 22.7% of the 
current mean level. These findings suggest that labor reform in India’s retail sector could 
have a significant effect on overall employment in the country given that the sector is the 
second largest employer (after agriculture) accounting for over 9% of all jobs. 
 
3.2  Enforcement index 
Corresponding results using the Enforcement index are provided in Table 5 and these are 
roughly similar to the ones we found above for the Regulation index. The estimated 
coefficient of the Enforcement index is negative and significant at less than 5% level in 
all the specifications and varies between -2.97 and -3.45. These estimates imply that 
lowering the Enforcement index from its median value (0.330) to the lowest value (0.109) 
will cause employment to increase in the range of 14-16 percent of the mean level of 
Employment.  
  Results for the remaining controls are also roughly similar to what we found 
above. Age has a positive effect on employment (significant at less than 5% level) while 
higher wages lower employment (significant at close to 5% level). Income and   15
Population show positive effects on employment but neither of these effects is significant 
at 10% level or less. Lastly, the estimated coefficient of the Enforcement index rises from 
-3.28 (column 1, Table 5) to -3.44 (column 2, Table 5) when we control for state per 
capita income, it falls from -3.44 to -2.97 (column 3, Table 5) when we control for the 
wage rate, it rises from -2.94 to -3.45 when we control for the age of the store and it is 
virtually unaffected by the population control.. 
 
3.3  Large vs. small stores 
One concern with the results could be that the negative effect of labor regulation on 
employment may be restricted to the relatively large stores with smaller stores 
experiencing no such effect. This is more worrisome for the Enforcement index since 
labor inspectors are more likely to target large than small stores. We experimented by 
dropping from the sample the largest 25% of the stores (in terms of floor area of the 
shop) and also by restricting the sample to the smallest 25% of the stores. The mean 
value of Employment for these sub-samples equals 2.1 (largest 75% of the stores) and 
1.25 (smallest 25% of the stores). 
Regression results for these sub-samples showed negative effects of the two labor 
regulation indices significant at less 5% level (not shown) for all the specifications 
discussed above. However, the absolute magnitudes of these effects were smaller than 
what we found above for the full sample. For example, controlling for all the variables 
discussed above, the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index equals -0.499 for the 
full sample above, -0.166 (significant at less than 1% level) for the smallest 75% of the 
stores and -0.073 (p-value of 0.002) for the smallest 25% of the stores. The   16
corresponding figures for the Enforcement index equal -3.45 (full sample above), -0.783 
(p-value of 0.047, smallest 75% of the stores) and -0.487 (p-value of 0.001, smallest 25% 
of the sample).  
All these effects are economically large and not too different when expressed as a 
percentage of the mean level of employment in the various samples. A decrease in the 
Regulation index from its median to the lowest value increases employment by 26.5% of 
the mean level of employment for the full sample (column 5, Table 4), 19.6% of the 
mean level of employment for the smallest 75% of the stores and 14.6% of the mean 
level of employment for the smallest 25% of the stores. The corresponding figures for the 
Enforcement index are 16% (full sample), 12.3% (smallest 75% of the stores) and 12.8% 
(smallest 25% of the sample), respectively. Hence, the negative effect of labor regulation 




Employment at the store level depends on the marginal productivity of labor vis-à-vis the 
marginal cost of labor. The list of factors which may affect the marginal benefit/cost of 
labor can be quite large. In this section we control for a number of such factors to ensure 
that the adverse effect of labor regulation on employment that we found above is not 
spuriously driven by omitted variables. We focus on the results for the Regulation index 
which are reported in Table 6. Regression results for the Enforcement index follow a 
similar pattern and are reported in Table 7. 
 
4.1  Income and overall development of cities 
                                                 
8 These results do not depend on the controls for income, wage rate, population and age.    17
In the specifications above we control for the current per capita income of the states and 
the total population of cities as a proxy for overall development. We complement these 
measures with three additional proxy measures of city level incomes and development 
which are the proportion of adults that are literate (Literacy), ratio of females to males 
(Sex ratio) and per capita expenditure (Expenditure). Literacy rate and sex ratio are 
defined at the city level and we use 2001 values of these variables taken from Census of 
India (2001). For expenditure, we use data from the 56
th round (1999-2000) of the 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). The NSSO routinely conducts nationally 
representative household surveys of expenditure levels which are reported at the district 
level.
9  
Controlling for literacy, sex ratio and expenditure level along with all the 
variables discussed above, we find that the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index 
does not change much. It decreases in value from -0.499 above to -0.441 (column 1, 
Table 6) but remains significant at less than 5% level (p-value of 0.032). Literacy, sex 
ratio and expenditure show positive effects on employment but none of these is 
statistically significant at 10% level or less. There is not much change from above in the 
estimated effects of the remaining variables in the specification. 
 
4.2 Recessionary and Expansionary trends 
Business cycles (recessions and expansions) may affect employment with a substantial 
lag. Hence, current per capita income and other proxy measures of overall development 
                                                 
9 The NSSO survey reports expenditure levels separately for the rural and urban parts of the district. We 
use estimates for the urban district population since it more closely resembles the cities in the Enterprise 
surveys. Our results do not change much if we use expenditure levels for the entire (rural plus urban) 
district.   18
discussed above may not fully control for the effect of business cycles on employment. 
We experimented by controlling for lagged values of state per capita income, population, 
etc. However, this made no difference to our results mainly because current and lagged 
values of income, etc., are highly correlated with one another. For example, the 
correlation between current per capita income of the states (Income) and its 10 year 
lagged value (1993-94 value) equal 0.965. We found similar correlation coefficients 
(above 0.90) between current and lagged values of literacy rate, sex ratio and population. 
 
4.3 Business climate 
In a series of questions, the Enterprise survey asked stores if tax rates, corruption, land 
laws, restrictions on store hour operations and obtaining licenses and permits were an 
obstacle for their business. Store’s responses to these questions were recorded on a 0-4 
scale defined as no obstacle (0), minor obstacle (1), moderate obstacle (2), major obstacle 
(3) and a very severe obstacle (4). As for the Enforcement index, we use state level 
average value of the reported scores on these questions as an index of the overall business 
climate or business regulations in the state (Business regulations). For additional 
robustness, we also control for the incidence of theft in the cities defined as the 
proportion of stores in the city that reported one or more incidence of theft during the 
fiscal year 2005-06 (Theft). We interpret Theft broadly to include its potential covariates 
such as crime, payment of protection money to mafia and law and order situation. 
 Regression  results  with  Business regulations and Theft added to the previous 
specification are reported in column 2 of Table 6. As expected, both these variables show 
negative effects on employment but these effects are not too strong (significant between   19
10-20% level). The estimated coefficient of the Regulation index here remains negative 
and significant at less than 5% level although it declines in value from -0.441 above to -
0.328. There is not much change in the estimated effects of the remaining variables. 
 
4.4  Infrastructure, contract enforcement and market competition 
We next control for measures of physical infrastructure availability, contract enforcement 
and the level of competition faced by stores. For infrastructure we use hours of power 
outage faced by stores per day on an average during the fiscal year 2005-06 (Outage). 
Power outages were voted as the single most important problem by the stores. For 
contract enforcement, we use percentage of store’s total sales that were never paid for 
(Non payment). The level of competition in the retail sector depends upon a number of 
factors such as the number of retail shops in a given area, intensity with which consumers 
search with best prices, etc. In one question, stores were asked how important is the 
influence of domestic competitors operating in the formal sector over prices of the store’s 
main products. We define Formal competition as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a store 
reported important or very important on this question and 0 otherwise (not at all 
important or slightly important). We note that a similar question was asked about 
competition from informal traders (Informality) which we discuss in more detail below. 
  Regression results controlling for outage, non-payment and formal competition 
along with all the variables discussed above are reported in column 3 of Table 6. Non 
payment shows a sharp negative effect on employment, significant at less than 1% level. 
However, there is no significant effect of power outages or formal competition on 
employment. The Regulation index continues to show a negative effect on employment   20
significant at less than 5% with little change in its magnitude (-0.317 compared to -0.328 
above). 
 
4.5  Product lines  
So far we have not said anything about the type of products sold by stores. Employment 
level is likely to differ between stores selling grocery items and consumer durables. If the 
distribution of these store-types varies across good and bad labor regulation states then 
the estimated effect of labor regulation on employment discussed above could still suffer 
from an omitted variable bias.  
  As mentioned in section 2, the survey classifies stores into three types: traditional 
stores, consumer durable stores and modern format stores. We use store-type fixed effects 
(defined in Table 1) which indicate whether a store is a traditional store or a modern 
format store (with consumer durable stores as the omitted category). Controlling for 
store-type fixed effects along with all the other variables discussed above did not change 
our main results significantly. The estimated coefficient of the Regulation index 
increased from -0.317 above to -0.399 with a p-value of 0.024 (not shown). 
 
4.6  Time spent on regulations 
Our next control is the percentage of store’s senior management’s time that is spent in 
dealing with various business regulations (Time). There are two important issues that are 
related to this variable. First, higher values of the variable suggest more cumbersome and 
stringent business laws. Hence, Time could serve as an additional proxy measure of the 
business climate (Fisman and Svensson 2007). A second issue with Time relates to the   21
work of Bo and Rossi (2007). The authors look at the efficiency (total factor 
productivity) of public utilities in Latin America and show that it is inversely correlated 
with the level of corruption in the country. They argue that corruption diverts labor-time 
from production to bribing the government officials and as a consequence, output falls. 
To cover up for lost labor-time and output, firms expand employment. Hence, the net 
effect of higher corruption is increased employment but lower efficiency. This creates a 
paradoxical situation: corruption, stringent labor laws and other burdensome regulations 
may increase employment but this extra employment is not gainful or economically 
efficient. One implication of this is that the negative effect of stricter labor laws on 
gainful employment may be bigger than on total employment.  
  Our regression results confirm the logic of Bo and Rossi with an important caveat. 
Time has a positive effect on employment significant at less than 1% level (not shown). 
Also, controlling for Time increases the estimated coefficient of Business regulations 
index from -0.752 (p-value of 0.326) in the previous specification to -1.11 (p-value of 
0.091). However, the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index falls in magnitude 
from -3.99 above to -0.369 (p-value of 0.021). In short, more stringent labor laws do not 
seem to increase non-gainful employment in the sense of Bo and Rossi but other business 
regulations do. Regression results for the remaining variables do not change much from 
above. 
 
4.7  Floor area of the shop 
So far we have said nothing about the most important characteristic of stores which is the 
floor area of the shop (Size). In our sample, the correlation between Size and Employment   22
equals 0.435. It is possible that differences in rental rates or availability of land correlated 
with the severity of labor regulations could cause a spurious correlation between 
employment and labor regulations. Size is also likely to be correlated with a number of 
store attributes such as access to fiancé, stock of inventories maintained by the store, etc., 
which could have direct effects on the level of employment. As a robustness check 
against these potential identification problems, we controlled for the floor area of the 
shop and found that our main results remained intact. These results are reported in 
column 4 of Table 6. As expected, Size has a positive effect on employment, significant 
at less than 1% level. We note that controlling for Size lowers the estimated effect of the 
Regulation index from -0.369 above to -0.345 (column 4, Table 6). This decline suggests 
that stricter labor laws cause both, employment and floor area to shrink. Hence, part of 
the decline in employment is wiped out when we control for floor area.  
 
4.8  Additional robustness checks 
We added a number of variables to the list of controls above and found that our main 
results did not change much. Briefly, these variables include: a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a store has a checking or savings account and 0 otherwise, dummy variable equal to 1 
if a store did not borrow from external sources during the last fiscal year because it felt 
no need to do so (financially independent) and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable equal to 1 
if a store is part of a larger chain and 0 otherwise, percentage of the store owned by the 
largest shareholder, proportion of floor area that is owned as opposed to rented and years 
of experience of the store’s manager in retailing. With all these controls, the estimated 
coefficient of the Regulation index equaled -0.339 (p-value of 0.012) compared to -0.345   23
in the previous specification (column 4, Table 6) above.
10 Lastly, we controlled for the 
level of informality (Informality) which caused the coefficient of the Regulation index to 
decline from -0.339 to -0.315 (p-value of 0.020). The decline was entirely because of 
difference in sample size due to missing observations on informality.
11 
 
4.9  Large vs. small stores 
Next, we check whether the negative effect of labor regulation on employment continues 
to hold for the relatively smaller stores or not. Controlling for all the variables discussed 
above (specification in column 4, Table 6), the estimated coefficient of the Regulation 
index equaled -0.120 (p-value of 0.001) for the smallest 75% of the stores and -0.098 (p-
value of 0.006) for the smallest 25% of the stores. For a comparison, the corresponding 
value for the full sample equals -0.345 (column 4, Table 6). Results using the 
Enforcement index are similar. The estimated coefficient of the index equals -2.82 (p-
value of 0.030) for the full sample (column 4, Table 7), -1.24 (p-value of 0.001) for the 
smallest 75% of the stores and -1.27 (p-value of 0.001) for the smallest 25% of the stores. 
 
4.10  Temporary versus permanent employment 
We argued above that labor regulations are directed mostly towards permanent workers. 
One implication of this is that the negative effect of labor regulations should be stronger 
on permanent than temporary employment. Our results confirm this view (Table 8). 
                                                 
10 We also controlled for the level of informality in the retail sector (Informality) as defined in section 5 and 
Table 1. However, this did not change our results much. The estimated coefficient of the Regulation index 
declined from -0.339 to -0.315 (p-value of 0.020) but this decline was entirely due to the difference in 
sample size (missing observations on Informality). The corresponding change for the coefficient of the 
Enforcement index was a marginal increase from -2.74 (p-value of 0.022) to -2.95 (p-value of 0.011). 
   24
Columns 1-4 of Table 8 show the effect of the labor regulation indices on permanent 
employment (with and without the various controls). These results are roughly similar to 
what we found above for total employment except that the estimated coefficients of the 
labor regulation indices are smaller. Corresponding results for temporary employment are 
provided in columns 5-8 of Table 8. The estimated coefficients of the Regulation index 
and the Enforcement index are much smaller and statistically insignificant here.
12 
 
5.  Labor regulation and Informality 
In this section we analyze the relationship between informality and labor regulation for 
the retail sector in India. As discussed in the introduction, the hypothesis is that stricter 
labor regulation implies fewer jobs in the formal (retail) sector which pushes some of 
those unable to find such jobs to operate in the informal sector.  
The Enterprise survey covers stores that operate only in the formal sector but it 
does provide information on the level of competition faced by stores from informal 
traders. Specifically, stores were asked: “For this store, how important is the 
pressure/influence from unorganized trade (hawkers, traders sitting on pavement, people 
selling from home, people selling spurious goods) over prices of its main products?” The 
response was recorded on a 1-4 scale defined as not at all important (1), slightly 
important (2), fairly important (3) and important (4). Using store responses on the 
question, we define Informality as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a store reported 
important or fairly important on the question above and 0 otherwise. The mean value of 
Informality is 0.189 and the standard deviation equals 0.391.  
                                                 
12 The contrasting results for permanent and temporary employment discussed here remain unchanged if we 
control for the variables discussed in section 4.8 (informality, managerial experience, etc) but not included 
in Table 8.   25
Regression results using a logit specification with Informality as the dependent 
variable are reported in Table 9. The results show a positive and significant effect (at less 
than 5% level) of stricter labor regulations on the incidence of informality and this holds 
for both the labor regulation indices and irrespective of the set of controls. The estimated 
effect is economically large. For the Regulation index, we find that an increase in its 
value from the lowest to the median level raises the incidence of informality in the range 
of 7.3 to 11.3 percentage points (against the mean of 18.9%). The corresponding range 
for the Enforcement index is 5.3 to 7.6 percentage points. 
  For the remaining controls, we find that larger cities (higher values of Population) 
show significantly lower levels of informality (significant around 5% level). We also find 
a negative effect of higher literacy rates on informality but this result is statistically weak.  
Similarly, we do not find any significant effect of infrastructure (power outages), age of 
the store and wage rate on informality.  
In contrast to these weak effects, measures of the business climate show 
significant effects on informality. For example, higher values of Theft are associated with 
more informality (significant at less than 1% level), more time spent in dealing with 
business regulations (a measure of regulatory burden) is associated with higher levels of 
informality, significant at close to 10% level (columns 3 and 6, Table 9). Similarly, more 
burdensome business regulations tend to increase informality (significant at less than 5% 
level, column 3, Table 9).
13 We believe that these results along with the ones for labor 
regulation provide ample support for the view that excessive regulation promotes 
informality. 
                                                 
13 The estimated effect of Business regulations on Informality is significant only when we use the 
Regulation index (column 3, Table 9) but it is insignificant when we use the Enforcement index (column 6, 
Table 9).   26
  Before concluding, we discuss two additional points about the set of controls used 
in this section. First, we have controlled for the level of competition in the formal sector 
(Formal competition) to eliminate any lingering concern that cities with more stringent 
labor laws may happen to be the ones that specialize in retailing (more formal and 
informal retailing activity). Second, the specifications discussed above did not control for 
the level of unemployment in the city. The implied assumption is that although 
unemployment may be positively correlated with the stringency of labor laws, it does not 
have a direct effect on informality. To ensure that our results above are not affected by 
this assumption, we controlled for the level of unemployment (city level values for 2001) 
in all the specifications listed in Table 9. None of the results discussed above were 
affected by this.
14 We found a weak positive effect of unemployment on informality 
(significant at less than 10% level) in some of the specifications but even this weak effect 
was not robust to some of the controls such as literacy and population. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
A number of studies have shown that burdensome labor regulations can hinder job 
creation. These studies are largely confined to the manufacturing sectors and use macro 
data. The present paper finds similar evidence for a service sector (retailing) using micro 
data. Our results show that labor regulations in India’s retail sector are detrimental to job 
creation and that labor reforms could increase employment in the sector by as much as 
22% of the current level for an average store. This is a large effect when we take into 
                                                 
14 For example, adding unemployment to the list of all other controls discussed above (specification in 
column 3, Table 9), the estimated coefficient of the Regulation index increased marginally from 0.028 
(column 3, Table 9) to 0.029 and remained significant at less than 1% level. The corresponding change for 
the Enforcement index was a decline from 0.227 (column 6, Table 9) to 0.209 (p-value of 0.006). In both 
these cases, the estimated coefficient of unemployment was statistically insignificant at 10% level or less.   27
account the fact that the retail sector in India is the second largest employer providing 
jobs to 9.4% of all workers. We also studied the issue of informality in India’s retail 
sector. The development of modern retailing in the country hinges crucially on a 
transition from the informal to the formal retail sector. Our results show that more 
stringent labor regulation promotes informality and that labor reforms may be necessary 
to achieve the transition. 
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Table 1: Description of Main Variables 
“Last fiscal year” below means fiscal year 2005-06. 
1 Indian Rupee (Rs.) = .025 USD as on 02/06/2008. 
Variable Description 
Employment   Total number of workers working in the store in the 
last fiscal year as reported by the respondents in the 
Enterprise Survey.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Informality  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a store reported 
important or fairly important and 0 otherwise for the 
following question: 
For this store how important is the pressure/influence 
from unorganized trade (hawkers, people selling from 
home, people selling spurious goods, traders sitting 
on pavement) for prices of its main products: not at 
all important, slightly important, fairly important or 
important. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Labor regulation indices (Regs)  
Regulation  index  An index of labor laws in formal manufacturing in 
India due to Besley and Burgess (2004). We use year 
2000 values of the index which is the latest available. 
The index is not available for the state of Delhi. 
Enforcement index  State level average value of the scores reported in the 
Enterprise Survey for the following question: “Are 
labor regulations No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a 
Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the 
current operations of this store?” The scores for these 
choices are from 0,1,2,3 and 4, respectively. Higher 
values of the index imply more pro-worker laws. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Age  2006 minus the year shop was established. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Income  Per capita income of the states in 2003-04 at 1993-94 
constant prices (log values). 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, based on CSO data. 
Description of Other Variables 
Variable Description 
Permanent employment   Number of permanent employees at the end of last   32
fiscal year. Permanent employees are defined as all 
paid employees that are contracted for a term of one 
or more fiscal years and/or have a guaranteed 
renewal of their employment contract and that work 8 
or more hours per day.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Temporary  employment    Number of temporary employees in the last fiscal 
year. Temporary workers are defined as all paid 
short-term (i.e. for less than a fiscal year) employees 
with no guarantee of renewal of contract employment 
and that work 8 or more hours per day.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Outage  Total number of hours of power failure faced by a 
store per day in a typical month.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Wage rate  State level average wage rate of workers employed in 
all factories in the registered manufacturing sectors. 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, 2003-04. 
Formal competition  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a store reported 
important or fairly important and 0 otherwise for the 
following question: 
For this store how important is the pressure/influence 
from domestic competitors (in the formal sector) for 
prices of its main products: not at all important, 
slightly important, fairly important or important. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Sex ratio  Ratio of females to males in the city in 2001. 
Source: Census of India, 2001. 
Literacy  Percentage of adults in the state who are literate in 
2001. 
Source: Census of India, 2001. 
Population  Total adult population of the city in 2001 (in 
millions). 
Source: Census of India, 2001. 
Expenditure  Mean per capita expenditure of the urban-district 
population in 1999-2000. Districts are larger than the 
cities and the urban part of the district more closely 
approximates the cities in our sample. The variable is 
expressed in thousand Indian Rupees. 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO), 55
th round, 1999-2000. 
Business Regulations  In one survey question, stores were asked the 
following: Is/Are the following No obstacle (0), 
Minor obstacle (1), Moderate obstacle (2), Major 
obstacle (3) or Very severe obstacle (4) to the current 
operations and growth of the store? Tax rates, Tax 
administration, Corruption, Access to Land, Business   33
licensing and permits, Regulations on hours of 
operation, Regulations on pricing & mark-ups. The 
index is the average at the state level of the reported 
scores on the question. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Time  Percentage of store’s senior management’s time that 
is spent in dealing with various business regulations. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Theft  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a store reported an 
incidence of theft in the last fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Store-type fixed effect  A set of two dummy variables indicating whether a 
store is a traditional store or a consumer durable 
store. Traditional stores include grocers, general 
stores, chemists, food stores, cosmetic stores, etc. 
Consumer durable stores sell consumer items. The 
omitted category is the set of remaining stores which 
are modern format stores (large stores part of a bigger 
shopping complex). 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Size  Total selling area of the store measured in square feet 
(log values) 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org)   34











        
Andhra Pradesh  58.7  78.77  61.73  57.50 
Bihar 61.98  61.98  61.98  61.98 
Delhi 99.70  99.70  N.A  99.70 
Gujarat 83.6  80.00  79.20  75.40 
Haryana 75.84  75.84  N.A  75.84 
Karnataka 70.38  69.13  70.54  70.53 
Kerala 84.46  114.73  65.78  N.A 
Madhya Pradesh  74.73  74.73  74.73  74.73 
Maharashtra 62.60  75.86  71.82  51.25 
Orissa 42.50  42.50  42.50  42.50 
Punjab 78.28  78.28  78.28  N.A 
Rajasthan 60.00  60.00  60.00  60.00 
Tamil Nadu  68.60  62.63  52.87  N.A 
Uttar Pradesh  77.97  77.97  71.73  79.35 
West Bengal  79.43  78.75  67.81  80.08 
Jharkhand N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A 
1. Source: “Report on the Working of the Minimum Wages Act., 1948 for the 
year 2001”, Labor Bureau, Government of India. The report is available at 
http://labourbureau.nic.in/MW2K1%20Main%20Page.htm 
2. N.A: Data not reported or not available.  
3. 2001 is the latest year for which data is easily available for most of the states in 
our sample. 
4.  1 Rs =  .025 USD as on 02/06/2008. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics and correlations for the main explanatory variables 
 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation
  
          
Regulation index   0.067  1.53    
          
Enforcement index   0.345  0.194     
          
Income 
(log values) 
 9.3  0.506    
Wage rate 
(Thousand Rupees) 
 0.179  0.725     
Population 
(millions) 
 1.93  2.39    
Age   14.5  12.8    
         
Correlation between main explanatory variables 
         




index  Income  Wage 
rate 
Population
Regulation index 1        
Enforcement index 0.473  1      
Income  0.060 0.237  1     
Wage rate  0.283 0.041  -0.080  1   
Population  0.332 0.303  0.222  0.012 1 
Age  0.082 0.138  0.016  0.039  0.040 
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Table 4: The Effect of Labor Regulation on Employment 
Dependent variable: Employment  
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)   












































           







          
Age 






2 0.006  0.007  0.008  0.008 0.011   
Sample Size  1818  1818  1818  1818 1818   
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on 
the state. Significance levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* 
(10% or less). Sample size varies due to missing observations. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Labor Regulation on Employment 
Dependent variable: Employment  
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)   












































           







          
Age 






2 0.004  0.004  0.006  0.006 0.009   
Sample Size  1927  1927  1927  1927 1927   
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on 
the state. Significance levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* 
(10% or less). Sample size varies due to missing observations. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Labor Regulation on Employment 
Dependent variable: Employment 












































































































Store-type fixed effects 
 
   Yes 
Time      0.148
* 
(0.066) 






2  0.012 0.014 0.024 0.297 
Sample Size  1818 1818 1771 1761 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the 
state. Significance levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or 
less). Sample size varies due to missing observations.  
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Table 7: The Effect of Labor Regulation on Employment 
Dependent variable: Employment 
















































































































Store-type fixed effects 
 
   Yes 
Time      0.143
* 
(0.059) 






2  0.012 0.019 0.023 0.298 
Sample Size  1927 1927 1876 1865 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the 
state. Significance levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or 
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Table 8: Temporary vs. Permanent Employment 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable  Permanent  Employment  Temporary  Employment 















                
Enforcement 
index 










                





















































































































Store-type fixed effects  Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes 













2  0.005 0.218  0.004  0.219   0.071  0.008  0.072 
Sample Size  1818 1770  1927  1874   1770  1927  1874 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the state. Significance 
levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). Sample size varies due to missing 
observations. Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is permanent employment and temporary employment in 
columns 5-8. 
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Table 9: The Effect of Labor Regulation on Informality  
Marginal effects from logit regressions 
Dependent variable: Informality        
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 












    
          
Enforcement 
index 









          
Literacy





















Formal competition   0.221
*** 
(0.000) 
   0.241
*** 
(0.000) 
          
Age     -0.0003 
(0.680) 




   0.612 
(0.854) 
   4.25
** 
(0.036) 
Sex ratio     0.541
** 
(0.048) 
   0.125 
(0.705) 
Size     -0.018
** 
(0.028) 
   -0.021
** 
(0.011) 
Wage rate      0.026 
(0.805) 
   0.125 
(0.254) 
          
Theft     0.648
*** 
(0.001) 
   0.700
*** 
(0.000) 
Business regulations   0.075
*** 
(0.004) 
   0.017 
(0.689) 
Time    0.002 
(0.117) 
   0.002 
(0.118) 
Outage     -0.002 
(0.616) 
   -0.002 
(0.602) 
Store-type fixed effects    Yes      Yes 
Predicted 
probability 
0.169 0.161  0.125 0.170 0.167  0.128 
Sample Size  1667 1667  1657 1763 1763  1742 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the state. 
Significance levels are denoted by: 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
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Summary Findings
A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India shows that 27% of the
stores find labor regulations as a problem for their business. Using
these data, we analyze the effect of labor regulations on employment at
the store level. We find that flexible labor regulations have a strong
positive effect on job creation. Our estimates show that labor reforms
are likely to increase employment by 22% of the current level for an
average store. We also address the issue of informality in India’s retail
sector. Our findings suggest that more flexible labor laws can encourage
firms to operate in the more efficient formal retail sector. According to
our estimates, labor reforms could reduce the level of informality by as
much as 33%.
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